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    Dialectics, the ancient technique1 of the sophists who sought, by argument and counter-
argument from agreed pre-suppositions and logical structure and with common value 
systems, to establish the truth2, has been refined and made more precise and has resulted in 
techniques like the genetic algorithm, which is a mathematical procedure for searching 
widely over a multi-dimensional configurational or parameter space, escaping from local 
minima, until a better solution, although perhaps not absolutely the best, is obtained. A 
measure of what is better or worse is, of course, also necessary. It operates like evolution by 
variation and natural selection of the fittest. The technique depends on being able to separate 
the problem into the real situation and its description in other terms and to translate or 
project backwards and forwards between these two alternative worlds, different in nature 
and not just opposing tendencies, which can be seen as hardware and software, body and 
soul or battlefield  and  map. Every creature has in its brain such a transformed model of its 
surroundings and of itself and can carry out potential operations with this model to assess 
possible outcomes. On this basis it can act in the real world. Thus, the dialectical tennis of 
the philosophers3, unrewarding for scientists, has now become explicit mathematics which, 
with computer models which embody appropriate results of experimental observations, can 
be useful. Chemistry, mimicking biology, has found the concept of the inorganic gene to be 
useful in exploring configurational space, but the implications are wider. 
                                                          
1 The footnote itself is an essential part of the technique of exposition expanding a linear 
discourse into a branched tree structure. See: Anthony Grafton, “The Footnote, a Curious 
History”, Faber and Faber, London, 1997. 
2 “What is truth said jesting Pilate and would not wait for an answer” (Francis Bacon) and 
the debate about the post-modernist attribution of equal validity to all systems of viewing the 
universe has now reached (the journals) Nature and Science. This debate on modern 
sophistry reached a peak with the appearance of Alan Sokal’s spoof paper, “Transgressing 
the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity”, Social Text 
(46/47), pp. 217-252, (1996) and this attack has been compounded with a book “Impostures 
Intellectuelles” by Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont. These documents and much resulting 
comment, are to be found on the Internet under the “Sokal Affair”. Sokal is at 
http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/ and the text is at http://www.h-
net.msu.edu/~nexa/links.html 
3 We cannot take philosophers very seriously. Roger Scruton, for example, in “Modern 
Philosophy”, London, 1994, p. 571, writes: “The study of space and time is complicated by 
the intrusion of physics.” 
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     Originally, in classical Greek times, dialectic was a method of enquiring into truth, by 
verbal disputation, with only slight reference to experiment and observation. It was refined 
by the Jesuits who introduced an official advocatus diaboli to test self-consistency and the 
soundness of the logic and  this is still the practice in oral examinations for a doctorate4 — 
only the fittest arguments survived and the truth evolved from the disputation, although the 
system contained the assumption that the truth lay within the framework, often theological, 
prescribed by the system itself. A less formal but more important example was the Coterie 
Holbachique, the dining group of the Enlightenment. Baron d’Holbach provided the 
immeasurably valuable subsidy to science and learning by giving dinner in his house in 
Paris for twenty people twice a week for thirty years. The leading figure was Denis Diderot 
(1713-1784)5 and several members contributed to the Encyclopaedia but many other 
significant people attended, including foreign visitors such as Benjamin Franklin and the 
intellectual climate of the eighteenth century was formed through the uninhibited 
discussions to and fro in an informal dialectic which took place in freedom and privacy. 
Although several figures were atheists several clerics attended. There have been many other 
such dining groups6 which sought by discussion to form a common intellectual atmosphere 
but none so important.  Nowadays, “think-tanks” have a different character. 
    G. F. W. Hegel (1770-1831) produced a philosophical system of considerable obscurity, 
called the dialectic, of “thesis, antithesis, synthesis” to account for change7. “At the 
foundation of Hegel’s thought was his understanding of dialectic, according to which every 
state of being inevitably brings forth its opposite. The interaction between these opposites 
then generates a third stage in which the opposites are integrated y they are at once 
overcome and fulfilled y into a richer and higher synthesis, which in turn becomes the basis 
for another dialectical process of opposition and synthesis”8. Hegel greatly influenced later 
German thought, in particular, that of Friedrich Engels and of Ernst Haeckel. The opposites 
were conceived of as being of similar status, like left and right, and not as completely 
different like word and deed. 
    Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) about 1875 developed his constructive philosophy of 
dialectical materialism9 which became the official “world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist 
                                                          
4  Continental, especially Russian, public doctorate examinations have an official 
“opponent” and are often occasions for a clash between rival schools which sometimes 
obscures even the candidate. 
5  Diderot’s embryonic ideas on evolution, organisms and life can be seen in his scandalous 
essay “D’Alembert’s Dream” (1769).  
6  In Victorian Britain there were the “X-club”, the Philosophical Club, the Coefficients and 
many others. In the 1930 and 40s the “Tots and Quots” (quot homines tot sententiae) was 
significant in applying science to the problems of the war.  
7 A. J. P. Taylor wrote: “For the first time thinkers made their peace with movement instead 
of insisting on a static universe. They were in fact fumbling towards the idea of evolution, 
which was perhaps the greatest creative idea of the nineteenth century”. Introduction to “The 
Communist Manifesto”, Penguin Books, 1967. 
8  R. Tarnas, “The Passion of the Western Mind”, New York, 1993. p.379. 
9  Engels wrote to Marx (30 May 1873): “This morning when I was in bed I had some 
dialectical ideas about the natural sciences. ... If you think that I have got hold of something 
here please keep it to yourself. I do not want some lousy Englishman to steal the idea. And it 
will take a long time to get it into shape”. (qu. W. O Henderson, “Engels: Selected writings”, 
Penguin, 1967. p. 393.) 
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Party” of the USSR10, although his notes on his philosophy of science were published only 
about 193511. Engels’ dialectics was developed from the formal dialectics of G. F. W. 
Hegel. It was then obligatory on the Continent to have a formal philosophy12.   Nothing is 
more characteristic of the British ruling class of the present time than their contempt for 
science and technology, the material basis for the production of the wealth which sustains 
them, unless it is their scorn for theory in general. J. D. Bernal also wrote: ``In England, 
more than in any other  country,  science  is felt  rather than thought. A defect of the English 
is their almost complete lack of systematic thinking.  Science to  them consists of a number 
of successful raids into the unknown.''13 For example,  The Times recently published a 
major article to the effect that “The national curriculum puts a quite unrealistic emphasis on 
science and mathematics, which few of us ever need''14,  whereas in the Victorian period 
even the SPCK (Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge) could produce “A 
Catechism of the Steam Engine'' so that all could understand the forces then changing 
society15. Victoria’s consort Prince Albert, educated in Germany, was very much aware of 
                                                          
10  for example: M. Cornforth, “Dialectical Materialism”, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 
1952. 
11 F. Engels, “Dialectics of Nature”, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954.  
 It should not be thought that Engels was an armchair philosopher. He was familiar both 
with the world of industry and with the slums of Manchester, describing these in “The 
Condition of the Working Class in England” (1844).  
12 We have acquired the word  Weltanschauung - (world outlook) from the German 
philosophers, since there seems to be nothing quite so theoretical in English.  
13 “The Social Function of Science”, 1938. p.197. 
14  Simon Jenkins, The Times, 11 May 1994. p.18. 
15 Birkbeck College of London University, from which I write, was founded in 1823 as the 
London Mechanics Insitute, of which Robert Malthus wrote:  “above all, the Mechanics 
Institutions, open the fairest prospect that, within a moderate period of time, the 
fundamentals of political economy will, to a very useful extent, be known to the higher, 
middle, and to a most important portion of the working classes of soci15  Diderot’s 
embryonic ideas on evolution, organisms and life can be seen in his scandalous essay 
“D’Alembert’s Dream” (1769).  
15  In Victorian Britain there were the “X-club”, the Philosophical Club, the Coefficients and 
many others. In the 1930 and 40s the “Tots and Quots” (quot homines tot sententiae) was 
significant in applying science to the problems of the war.  
15 A. J. P. Taylor wrote: “For the first time thinkers made their peace with movement instead 
of insisting on a static universe. They were in fact fumbling towards the idea of evolution, 
which was perhaps the greatest creative idea of the nineteenth century”. Introduction to “The 
Communist Manifesto”, Penguin Books, 1967. 
15  R. Tarnas, “The Passion of the Western Mind”, New York, 1993. p.379. 
15  Engels wrote to Marx (30 May 1873): “This morning when I was in bed I had some 
dialectical ideas about the natural sciences. ... If you think that I have got hold of something 
here please keep it to yourself. I do not want some lousy Englishman to steal the idea. And it 
will take a long time to get it into shape”. (qu. W. O Henderson, “Engels: Selected writings”, 
Penguin, 1967. p. 393.) 
15  for example: M. Cornforth, “Dialectical Materialism”, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 
1952. 
15  F. Engels, “Dialectics of Nature”, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954.  
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the role of science and technology and himself organised the Great Exhibition of 1851 to 
emphasise Britain’s pre-eminence in this. In our period Paul Kennedy’s thesis is that 
political and military power spring from technological power.  
    Even Mrs Thatcher sometimes realised this lack of theoretical understanding and of a 
Weltanschauung. She told the Conservative Philosophy Group: ``We must have an ideology. 
The other side have got an ideology they can test their policies against. We must have one as 
well.''16 Chemists (among whom Mrs Thatcher liked to count herself) are in general more 
apolitical than most scientists and regard with distaste the continental tradition of having a 
compulsory philosophy examination as part of the Ph.D. course. This long tradition carried 
over into the general courses in dialectical materialism which formed part of the general 
ideological education in the USSR and was not a specific Soviet invention. The English 
managed quite well without a philosophy whereas, for example, Lenin spent a month in the 
British Museum Library writing to refute the philosophical doctrines of (among others) his 
rival A. A. Bogdanov (1873-1928) and Marx worried even about the philosophy of 
mathematics17. 
   Marx and Engels “stood Hegel on his head” and adapted his form to their own ends. It was 
a period of great change not only technologically but politically as revolutions swept Europe 
in 1848 so that a theory of change was necessary. Marx and Engels wrote the Communist 
Manifesto in 1848 and took very active parts in the events of the time. During his stay in 
Manchester (185-1870) Engels was much influenced as regards science by Carl 
Schorlemmer (1834-1892)18, whom he met at the Schiller Anstalt19 in Manchester. 
Schorlemmer (elected FRS in 1871), who became the first professor of organic chemistry in 
Britain (at Owen’s College), was concerned with the chemistry of the oil newly discovered 
in Pennsylvania, and the mantra of dialectical materialism about the “transformation of 
quantity into quality”, promulgated in the textbook Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism20 
derived directly from Schorlemmer’s studies of the series of hydrocarbons with increasing 
numbers of carbon atoms21. At much the same time the mathematician J. J. Sylvester noted 
the surprising connections between algebra and chemical structure22, a branch of 
mathematics now increasingly active and important with the advent of the computer and 
comprehensive data bases. But, for example, N. I. Bukharin, the chief exponent of science in 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 It should not be thought that Engels was an armchair philosopher. He was familiar both 
with the world of industry and with the slums of Manchester, describing these in “The 
Condition of the Working Class in England” (1844).  
15  We have acquired the word  Weltanschauung - (world outlook) from the German 
philosophers, since there seems to be nothing quite so theoretical in English.  
15 “The Social Function of Science”, 1938. p.197. 
15  Simon Jenkins, The Times, 11 May 1994. p.18. 
ety in England. “An Essay on the Principles of Population”, 1798. 
16  qu. Hugo Young, “One of Us”, Macmillan, London, 1989. p.406. 
17  The Marx-Engels Archive is alive and well and living in Colorado at 
http/:csf.colorado.edu/psn/marx 
18 “Carl Schorlemmer 1834-1892”, Merseburg (DDR), 1974. 
19 The Schiller Anstalt was an important club where Germans, who had been attracted to 
Manchester as the centre of the Industrial Revolution, gathered socially. Karl Halle, founder 
of the Halle Orchestra was a member, as was Ludwig Mond the founder of Imperial 
Chemical Industries. 
20 (ed. O. Kuusinen), “Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism”, FLPH, Moscow, 1963. 
21 In pursuit of his studies of oil Schorlemmer, in 1888, visited Pennsylvania with Engels.  
22 J. J. Sylvester, “Chemistry and Algebra”, Nature, 17, 284, 309, (1877/78)  
 4
the Bolshevik Party23, insisted that change need not be gradual: “The transformation of 
quantity into quality is one of the fundamental laws in the motion of matter; it may be traced 
literally at every step both in nature and in society.” “the notion that nature permits of no 
such violent alterations is merely a reflection of the fear of such shifts in society”. With the 
emergence of computers the complex phenomenology of non-linear systems can now be 
handled much more expeditiously and the results have influenced even philosophy by 
illuminating concepts such as “reductionism” and “determinism”.  
   Engels was a major channel for the input of science24 into the Marxist-Leninist world 
outlook and he introduced Schorlemmer to Marx in Manchester. Manchester was the centre 
of the Industrial Revolution and many foreigners, envious of its success, came there to see 
how it worked25. The first enterprises to apply power and technology to production earned 
enormous rates of return, until their monopolies could be broken. With this vision of 
industrialisation, Lenin, prompted by Bukharin26, tried to carry out something like the 
(Chinese) Great Leap Forward, by jumping directly from steam power to electric power. 
“Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country” y was a major 
slogan of the 1920s. Thus, Engels, although beginning with the Hegelian concept of struggle 
between two opposing tendencies, like the class struggle, advanced to the idea that 
something completely new, not just a compromise, might emerge from the conflict. 
   The basic principle governing change is, besides the laws of thermodynamics, the 
principle of evolution enunciated by Darwin in his “Origin of Species” in 1859. This was of 
the greatest interest to Marx, Engels and many others, and particularly to the biologist, Ernst 
Haeckel (1834-1919) who, like T. H. Huxley in Britain, promoted Darwin’s ideas in 
Germany. It is important to note that at that time there were close connections between 
politics and science27. Yet, although Darwin elucidated the mechanism of evolution, he 
could say nothing about the hereditary substance and the material mechanisms by which the 
contributions of the two parents were combined and transmitted. The atomic basis of this 
mechanism was revealed in 1953 in the structure of DNA, discovered by Francis Crick and 
J. D. Watson, which marked a turning point in human history only now becoming fully 
appreciated with the commercialisation of the manipulation of substances, not directly as 
organisms or chemicals, but through their genetic representations.  
   Haeckel spent most of his life as Professor of Biology in Jena. He was more a naturalist 
than an experimental scientist and was particularly engaged in propagating Darwin’s theory 
of evolution but he was, as a polemicist, even in his own time, found to be careless of the 
                                                          
23 Also editor of the “Great Soviet Encyclopaedia”, leader of the delegation to the 1932 
Congress on the History of Science, etc. He once offered the whole electricity supply of 
Leningrad for one day to George Gamow for an experiment perhaps foreshadowing nuclear 
fusion.   
24  S. F. Cohen, in “Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution”, Wildwood House, London, 
1971. 
25 Engels had written, very presciently, “Modern industry has established the world market” 
(Communist Manifesto, 1848). 
26  “... we must do our utmost to promote the union of science with  technique  and  with  the  
organisation of  production.  COMMUNISM SIGNIFIES INTELLIGENT,  PURPOSIVE  
AND  CONSEQUENTLY, SCIENTIFIC  PRODUCTION.  WE  SHALL, THEREFORE, 
DO EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THE  
SCIENTIFIC  ORGANISATION OF PRODUCTION.'' Azbuka Kommunizma,  Peterburg,  
1920. (Bukharin’s capitals). 
27  Two fellows of the Royal Society were among the 20 or so people who attended the 
funeral of Karl Marx in 1883. 
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soundness of his evidence and did not apologise or correct himself when found to have 
supported his arguments with mistaken pictures. He is best known now for his descriptions 
of radiolaria and diatoms from the Challenger Expedition and particularly for the drawings 
(etched by E. Giltsch but earlier by Wagenschieber) contained in these reports28 which have 
often been reprinted and reproduced. Haeckel was also a gifted amateur artist (as was Louis 
Pasteur) and produced about 1000 sketches of his biological travels.  
   Haeckel, in opposition to religion, and particularly in opposition to the Catholic Church,  
sought to give a non-religious account of the origin and operation of life. His polemic book 
“The Riddle of the Universe” (1899) sold more than 500,000 copies. However, Haeckel 
created for himself a new religion, monism, which had political objectives, although it is 
unfair to blame him retrospectively for the later ideology of the Nazi Party29, and he 
obscured the straightforward materialist picture. Although he called his doctrine monism it 
was in fact a dualism and Haeckel confusingly re-defined the concept of soul for his own 
purposes. What Haeckel realised was that matter by itself had to operate with some 
organising principle, like hardware and software, but he could find no material structure for 
this30. In emphasising the continuity of all nature, he deduced that if human beings had souls 
and mental life, so must all other beings, right down to the atomic level31. In describing the 
intricate symmetrical order of single-cell organisms it was obvious to him that there must be 
a blue-print or plan embedded in the organism and not imposed from outside by a creator. 
The topic of morphogenesis is now very active and it is becoming apparent that the 
biological “living” component of a cell is the dominant partner and “uses” various chemical 
and physical phenomena which have become symbiotically enveloped into the mechanism. 
A clear example of this is the survival value imparted to magneto-tropic bacteria by the 
presence of grains of magnetite, which lead it to swim down into the anaerobic mud at the 
bottom of a pond. Bacteria in the North and South magnetic hemispheres are oppositely 
magnetised. Bacteria which swim up to the surface do not reproduce as well. 
   Almost at the end of his life, Haeckel seized on the discovery by Otto Lehmann (about 
1904) of the phenomena of liquid crystals, which furnished a clear and simple example of 
self-organisation. Lehmann himself claimed that this was an example of the simplest 
                                                          
28 Stimulated by Haeckel's drawings of radiolaria a 25m span geodesic dome was 
constructed for the Zeiss Planetarium in Jena (Haeckel's home town) in 1925/26 (first 
version 1923), long before Buckminster Fuller. It survived the air-raids. The metal 
framework was embedded in concrete, only 6cm thick, so that the steel network became 
invisible. Similar domes had been built in various cities, including Chicago (1930) by the 
Zeiss-Dywidag System. See, for example: "Jena und Umgebung", VEB Tourist Verlag, 
Berlin-Leipzig, (1977). p.83.  
29 D. Gasman, "The Scientific Origins of National Socialism", Macdonald, London. 
30 We may think of Bernard Shaw's play "Misalliance" where Tarleton says: "I've got a soul: 
dont tell me I havnt. Cut me up and you cant find it. Cut up a steam engine and you cant find 
the steam. But, by George, it makes the engine go". 
31 Freeman Dyson wrote much more recently: "But I, as a physicist, cannot help suspecting 
that there is a logical connection between the two ways in which mind appears in my 
universe ... I think our consciousness is not just a passive epiphenomenon carried along by 
chemical events in our brains, but is an active agent forcing the molecular complexes to 
make choices between one quantum state and another. In other words, mind is already 
inherent in every electron, and the processes of human consciousness differ only in degree 
but not in kind from the processes of choice between quantum states which we call `chance` 
when they are made by electrons." Disturbing the Universe" Harper and Row, New York, 
1979 
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possible “inorganic life” and Haeckel took up this line at the age of 83 in his last book 
“Crystal Souls y Studies of Inorganic Life” (1917)32. He was not original in this and many 
people, especially in Germany, had been seduced by the over-simple-analogy between the 
growth of crystals and the growth of cells. This is the central point of our argument. It was 
not then realised that cells have a built-in store of information which guides their 
development, whereas crystals grow only by the general shaking down to a state of 
minimum energy. The chain led through Goethe to Schleiden, Schwann and Weismann33 
(and remnants of Naturphilosophie are still kept alive in the school of Rudolf Steiner).  
Haeckel related the self-organisation of liquid crystals to the external shapes of the skeletons 
of radiolaria and diatoms which he had described, with exceptionally beautiful drawings, in 
materials from the Challenger Expedition. He lacked the concept of information and found it 
necessary to regard these single-cell organisms as endowed with some organising principle 
which he called “soul”, then not having any idea of the actual material mechanisms carrying 
the necessary information which only really began to become clear after the discovery in 
1953 of the arrangement of atoms in the genetic apparatus and later of the genetic code and 
the molecular basis of evolution. 
   Evolution works by a ratchet mechanism, not necessarily in the direction of what human 
beings may regard as “progress”x the parasitic tapeworm is also the highest product of 
evolution x and depends on the generation of variants of a structure and “the survival of the 
fittest”. These ideas have recently been given new twists into new directions by John 
Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmáry and by David Mermin. The former suggest that the 
macrocosmos may even have evolved by the selection of black holes (Nature, 14 Nov. 1966 
and, at the lower end of the scale of size,  David Mermin said of the microcosmos: "It is 
because nothing required us to apprehend atomic structure during our evolutionary 
development that we are incapable of understanding what it is that quantum physics 
describes." (Nature). There is still more mileage in the concept of evolution by natural 
selection and the genetic algorithm34, mentioned above, is based on this principle and is 
used in computer science, for example in designing new molecules. 
   Evolution, as exhibited by the DNA/Protein system, is not the same as dualism. In 
mathematics, the process of inversion of a geometrical structure in a circle (if in two 
dimensions) or in a sphere (for three), or the procedure of conformal transformation, gives a 
structure which is strictly equivalent, but where symmetries can be shown up by the choice 
of inversion centre. Thus the packing of five mutually tangent spheres of different radii is 
difficult as it stands but, after inversion to make them all of the same radii (or planes), 
become trivial. One goes backwards and forwards without progress. Similarly, in 
crystallography, the Fourier transformation of a periodic structure gives another three-
dimensional (reciprocal) lattice, which is important because it relates closely to the data 
derived from X-ray diffraction, but the transformation is completely reversible and 
performing it twice returns the original structure. 
  The natural language of DNA/protein, the genetic code is very appropriately termed a 
language35. Hitherto we have only recognised the languages used by human beings in 
                                                          
32 E. Haeckel, “Kristallseelen”, Leipzig, 1917. 
33 J. Lorch, “The Charisma of Crystals in Biology”, in “The Interaction between Science and 
Philosophy”, ed. Y. Elkana, Humanities Press, 1975. 
34 A purely computer example is to be found in The Mathematica Journal, 3, (2), 52-55, 
(1993). 
35 The development of natural languages and of the human genome agree in the information 
they give on the migration of human beings. 
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mutual discourse and the dialectic depends on projecting some material situation into words, 
which are then manipulated and transformed back again into conclusions about the real 
material world. A situation transformed into language and back again arrives back somewhat 
different because a description is never a complete description. 
    Having recognised that DNA is a “description” (or prescription) containing information 
for a protein sequence, we can ask where the corresponding description or programme for 
other structures may be. It then appears that in other structures the information is more 
diffusely stored. The structure of complex minerals appears as a result of local rules and 
there is no concentrated informational organ. The recognition of the concept of information 
as a parallel to structure has transformed our attitudes to complexity. We now look for the 
programme giving rise to the complexity and can define complexity of a structure in terms 
of the minimum programme which could  give rise to it. 
   The essential for evolution is that there should be two systems and processes of translation 
from one to another. A physical system and its description in some other language supply 
the pertinent example. The process of translation is really a generalised projection and the 
key feature of projection is that it is irreversible, because information is lost in the process, 
and the original system can only be restored if other knowledge is introduced. Thus, to 
restore a locomotive from a blue-print requires a knowledge of contemporary engineering 
technology. To make a blue-print of a locomotive requires the ignoring of a mass of 
standard features which every engineer  knows.  
   Biological systems are the most remarkable because both protein and gene are built of the 
same atoms, subject to the same laws of chemistry. Essentially the DNA sequence 
corresponding to a protein is the address, in configuration space, of the protein sequence. 
This means that, given the sequence and appropriate machinery, we can go straight to the 
address. In ordinary chemical synthesis the point representing the state of the system has to 
be navigated through the multi-dimensional energy landscape, like Waddington’s epigenetic 
landscape, and like a ball on a pin-table, by tilting the machine (for example, by changing 
the concentrations and temperature) to get the ball into the required hole. In biosynthesis, we 
can give the address of the hole and make the required protein by going to it directly. It is 
unrealistic to think of a protein like lysozyme as being a metastable phase in the system 
C/N/O/H/S. The address in configuration space is an equivalent description of the molecule. 
If we give the wrong address we get to the wrong place. The topology of this configuration 
space may be very complicated.  
   In computing, the genetic algorithm36 follows the ideas of natural evolution. We deal with 
the evolution of some structure, very generally conceived with some criterion of value in 
mind. It is necessary to have a description of this structure in a form which can be edited. A 
linear 1-D structure is easy to edit; a 2-D structure, such as the front page of a newspaper is 
more difficult and a 3-D structure is prohibitive.   
   If we wish to model a three-dimensional structure, such as a silicate, then a linear 
description is required. Mathematics, executed now by computer, is also now beginning to 
furnish us with an “inorganic gene37” with which we can first describe, classify and predict 
inorganic structures and which may eventually facilitate their synthesis as proteins are now 
synthesised.  
                                                          
36 John Holland, “Genetic Algorithms”, The Scientific American, July 1992. 44-50. D. E. 
Goldberg, “Genetic Algorithms in Searches, Optimization and Machine Learning”, Addison 
Wesley, Reading, MA., 1989. 
37 A. L. Mackay, “Generalised Crystallography”, Jour. of Molecular Structure (Theochem), 
336, 293-303, (1995). 
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   Earlier philosophical systems analysed economics and society as equilibrium systems, in 
many cases fixed by the unchanging dogmas of sacred texts. Change can now also be 
handled. Newton and Leibnitz provided the tools for physics and Hegel introduced the idea 
of dialectics in philosophy. In science there are many new ways of handling change, for 
example, the epigenetic landscape of C. H. Waddington for biology, all kinds of computer 
simulations of systems ranging from the Solar system (found to be weakly chaotic) to the 
British economy. Arthur Winfree, a pioneer in dealing with non-linear systems, gave his 
book the intriguing title “The geometry of biological time” indicating that changes in time 
and space were intimately mixed (as also in relativity) although Joseph Needham had much 
earlier written: "form is simply a short time-slice of a single spatio -temporal entity''. The 
sudden changes in such systems have been illustrated in the ‘catastrophe theory’ of RenË 
Thom which has been expounded by Christopher Zeeman for social as well as for physical 
systems. They find that there are only seven types of geometrical singularities in the 
configuration space. These are by way of being mathematisations of the “double bind” kind 
of situation which philosophers describe where one can get out of a knot only by jumping to 
some other position. 
 
   A current danger is that presented by the fashion of post-modernism, where all systems of 
analysing the world may be regarded as equally valid and the material basis of the world is 
hardly distinguished from its verbal representation, although the scientific world has the 
distinction between software and hardware as a dominant concept. However, there have 
been counter attacks, besides that by Sokal38, for example by Ernest Gellner, who insists on 
the reality of things and as a social anthropologist standing between the physical and social 
sciences, gives a marvellous statement39 of what science is40. We must recall Dr Johnson’s 
simple refutation of solipsism: “Dr Johnson struck his foot with mighty force against a large 
stone, till he rebounded from it, saying, ‘I refute it thus’”. The division is between those who 
actually work with things and those who manipulate the media. For the latter the word may 
become more real than the mere facts. But, as Burns put it: “Facts are chiels that winna ding, 
an’ downa be disputed” [facts are facts]. More and more, for example with the examination 
by PET (positron emission tomography) the living brain can, with the methods of science, 
be seen at work on intellectual tasks, so that the preserves of the philosophers and the 
humanists are being enfolded into the domain of science and science takes more and more 
note of all other human concerns41 such as art, language and emotions. We are in an 
                                                          
38  In May 1995 the NY Academy of Sciences held a symposium published as: “The Flight 
from Reason”, ed. P. R. Gross and N. Levitt, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1997.  
39  E. Gellner, “Post-modernism, Reason and Religion”, Routledge, London, 1992. 
40  (ibid. p.58.) “natural science ... 1. Its propositions and claims are translatable without loss 
of efficacy into any culture and any milieu. 2. In its applied or technological form, this new 
knowledge has totally transformed the human social condition, and the terms of reference 
under which mankind lives. ... 
3. In its internal organisation, the new learning which makes the new social order possible is 
both cumulative and astonishingly consensual. ...  4. This new learning respects neither the 
culture, nor the morality, of either the society in which it was born, or of those in which it 
makes itself at home by diffusion. It is, most emphatically, ‘beyond culture and morality’. ... 
Past belief systems were technically spurious and morally consoling. Science is the opposite. 
...  Its failure to legitimate social arrangements, and to make men feel at home in the world, 
is the commonest charge levied at science. This charge is entirely valid.” 
41 For example the journal Nature has, over the last few months, carried a column on visual 
art. 
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agreeable period of synthesis, but the dualities of software and hardware are at present 
dominant brought home by the spread of the computer.  
 
 Alan L. Mackay, 10 April 1998 
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